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MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S UNEXPECTED IMPACT ON THE
ENVIRONMENT: AN ANALYSIS OF JUSTICE KAVANAUGH’S
MEXICHEM FLUOR, INC. V. EPA
I. JUSTICE KAVANAUGH, WEBSTER, AND THE ENVIRONMENT
Merriam-Webster: a name synonymous with the word “diction-
ary.”1  While individuals primarily use dictionaries in everyday life,
courts sometimes employ them to resolve statutory disputes.2  Dic-
tionaries can help elucidate the meaning of statutory language
when congressional intent is unclear.3  In the environmental con-
text, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colom-
bia Circuit heavily relied on Merriam-Webster in Mexichem Fluor,
Inc. v. EPA,4 and this reliance led the court to conclude the EPA did
not have the authority to ban hydrofluorocarbon (HFC) use in cer-
tain circumstances under Section 612 of the Clean Air Act (CAA).5
For most of the twentieth century, the world focused on the
dangers of ozone-depleting substances.6  Unfortunately, this focus
may have prevented a deeper look into other dangerous substances
lurking in the air, like greenhouse gases.7  HFCs are potent green-
house gases that remain in the atmosphere for a long time, which
partly allows them to “trap thousands of times more heat in our
1. See WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d. ed. 1993) (providing
definitions of hundreds of thousands of words).
2. See Adam Liptak, Justices Turning More Frequently to Dictionary, and Not Just for
Big Words, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 13, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/14/us/
14bar.html (discussing prevalent dictionary use in court rulings).
3. See Liptak, supra note 2 (revealing courts from 2000 to 2010 employed dic-
tionaries in 225 opinions).
4. 866 F.3d 451, 458-60 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (considering definition of “replace”).
5. See id. at 458-59 (emphasizing EPA did not properly interpret “replace”
which rendered their interpretation of Section 612 implausible).
6. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7671k (2012) (implementing plan to address ozone
depletion only); Jennifer Fisher & Stephen Wilson, Explainer: Hydrofluorocarbons
Saved the Ozone Layer, so Why Are We Banning Them?, THE CONVERSATION (Nov. 1,
2017),  http://theconversation.com/explainer-hydrofluorocarbons-saved-the-o
zone-layer-so-why-are-we-banning-them-86672 (explaining reliance on greenhouse
gases to replace ozone-depleting substances before knowing these gases were
dangerous).
7. See 42 U.S.C. § 7671k (focusing on eradicating ozone-depleting substances
usage and listing greenhouse gases as safe substitutes to ozone-depleting sub-
stances); see also Fisher & Wilson, supra note 6 (contrasting improvement in de-
creasing ozone-depleting substances with HFC’s detrimental effect).
(321)
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atmosphere than an equivalent amount of CO2.”8  They also con-
tribute to heat waves, severe natural disasters, poor air quality, and
an increase of waterborne or foodborne pathogens, all of which
detrimentally impact the environment and human health.9  While
the ozone layer is on the path to reparation, a variety of products,
including aerosols, air conditioners, and refrigerators, rely heavily
on HFCs.10  Prohibiting HFC use would reduce these risks and pro-
vide manufacturers with the opportunity to employ more efficient
alternatives.11
In 2009, recognizing the serious danger posed by HFCs, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) adopted a new regulation
which concluded greenhouse gases, including HFCs, “endanger
both the public health and the public welfare of current and future
generations.”12  Former President Barack H. Obama typically sup-
ported the EPA’s actions against climate change.13  In 2013, Presi-
dent Obama formulated a Climate Change Action Plan,
encouraging a reduction of HFC use and giving the EPA authority
to act accordingly.14
8. Fisher & Wilson, supra note 6 (discussing why HFCs are one of most dan-
gerous greenhouse gases).
9. See Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse
Gases under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act [hereinafter EPA Findings], 74
Fed. Reg. 66,496, 497 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. Ch. 1) (reviewing
findings on dangers of greenhouse gases).
10. See Andrew Klekociuk & Paul Krummel, After 30 Years of the Montreal Proto-
col, the Ozone Layer is Gradually Healing, THE CONVERSATION (Sep. 14, 2017), https:/
/theconversation.com/after-30-years-of-the-montreal-protocol-the-ozone-layer-is-
gradually-healing-84051 (discussing improvement in ozone layer repair); see also
Fisher & Wilson, supra note 6 (explaining HFCs’ role as replacement to CFCs and
HFCs’ functions).
11. See Kristin Igusky, Reducing HFCs in the US Would Benefit Consumers and the
Climate, WORLD RESOURCES INST. (Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.wri.org/blog/2015/
03/reducing-hfcs-us-would-benefit-consumers-and-climate (citing research indicat-
ing large corporations like Ben & Jerry’s improved efficiency by using less environ-
mentally impactful alternatives to HFCs).
12. EPA Findings, 74 Fed. Reg. at 66,496 (summarizing implications of find-
ings regarding greenhouse gases).  The EPA discussed research indicating green-
house gases impact “food production and agriculture, forestry, water resources, sea
level rise and coastal areas, energy, infrastructure, and settlements, and ecosystems
and wildlife.” Id. at 66,498 (describing areas greenhouse gases impact).
13. See Gregory Korte, Here are 10 Obama Environmental Policies Trump Wants to
Scrap, USA TODAY (Mar. 28, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics
/2017/03/28/the-obama-environmental-regulations-trump-wants-scrap/9972
9650/ (discussing Obama’s regulations supporting environment and Trump’s
plans to stop these efforts).  Among former President Obama’s considerations for
these regulations was greenhouse gases’ impact. See id. (describing factors Obama
considered for each environmental regulation).
14. See Executive Office of the President, The President’s Climate Action Plan,
OBAMA WHITE HOUSE 10 (June 2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/
sites/default/files/image/president27sclimateactionplan.pdf (encouraging EPA
2
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Unlike former President Obama, President Donald J. Trump
generally has not supported environmental regulation.15  In the
CAA context, President Trump has taken steps to decrease air pol-
lution restraints in order to increase manufacturing.16  Against this
backdrop, President Trump recently nominated a judge to take the
place of retiring Supreme Court Justice, Anthony Kennedy.17  He
chose D.C. Circuit Judge Brett M. Kavanaugh, who appears to be a
more conservative judge than Justice Kennedy.18  The Senate nar-
rowly appointed Justice Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court on Octo-
ber 6, 2018.19
This Note examines Justice Kavanaugh’s decision in Mexichem
Fluor, its impact on the environment and the law, and its implica-
tions for the future makeup of the Supreme Court.20  Section II
describes the facts giving rise to Mexichem Fluor.21  Section III pro-
to find alternatives to greenhouse gases through Significant New Alternatives Pol-
icy Program).
15. See Michael Greshko et al., A Running List of How President Trump is
Changing Environmental Policy, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Mar. 12, 2019), https://news.
nationalgeographic.com/2017/03/how-trump-is-changing-science-environment/
(listing Trump’s changes that are affecting environment).  The environmental
changes include dismantling Obama’s plans to preserve the environment and
other regulations restricting air pollution. Id. (describing Trump’s undermining
of Obama’s fuel economy goals specifically).
16. See Ledyard King, President Trump Directs EPA to Ease Air Quality Rules He
Says Suffocates Industry, USA TODAY (Apr. 16, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/politics/2018/04/16/president-trump-directs-epa-ease-air-quality-rules
-he-says-suffocates-industry/512898002/ (describing Trump’s focus on deregula-
tion and commentators’ concerns that this focus will detrimentally affect
environment).
17. See Amy Howe, Trump Nominates Kavanaugh to Supreme Court, SCOTUSBLOG
(July 9, 2018), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/07/trump-nominates-kava
naugh-to-supreme-court/ (discussing Trump’s recent Supreme Court nomination
in light of Justice Kennedy’s retirement).
18. See id. (comparing Kavanaugh’s conservative tendencies with his speech
indicating willingness to be bipartisan).
19. See William Conlon, A Quick Look at Brett Kavanaugh, The New Supreme Court
Justice, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (Oct. 7, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/10/07/
654893306/a-quick-look-at-brett-kavanaugh-the-new-supreme-court-justice (discuss-
ing Justice Kavanaugh’s appointment); see also Andy Kroll, Brett Kavanaugh Narrowly
Confirmed by Senate in Historic, Controversial Vote, ROLLING STONE (Oct. 6, 2018),
https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/brett-kavanaugh-confirmed-
supreme-court-733860/ (describing long term impact of Kavanaugh’s approval
now that Supreme Court has conservative majority).
20. For further discussion of the court’s holding, see infra notes 105-42 and
accompanying text. For further discussion of the holding’s impact, see infra notes
195-243 and accompanying text.  For clarity, Justice Kavanaugh was a D.C. Circuit
judge at the time of the Mexichem Fluor opinion, but he will be referred to as Justice
throughout this Note to reflect his Supreme Court appointment.
21. For further discussion on the facts of Mexichem Fluor, see infra notes 26-38
and accompanying text.
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vides a legal framework and background of the issues in this case.22
Section IV provides a legal analysis of the D.C. Circuit’s majority
and dissenting opinions.23  Section V provides a critique of the
court’s analysis and reasoning.24  Finally, Section VI concludes with
a discussion of the decision’s impact in multiple contexts.25
II. THE SITUATION WHERE WEBSTER CAME TO THE RESCUE
Mexichem Fluor and Arkema are two manufacturers that used
HFCs in a variety of products because they relied on HFCs’ classifi-
cation as a safe alternative to ozone-depleting substances under Sec-
tion 612 of the CAA.26  In 2015, the EPA announced a new rule
removing HFCs’ title as a safe substitute, meaning companies
needed to find other EPA-approved substances in manufacturing
their products.27  Mexichem Fluor brought suit challenging this re-
moval on two grounds.28  First, Mexichem Fluor argued the EPA
lacked statutory authority to make this change, as the EPA did not
have CAA authorization to regulate safe substitutes like HFCs once
manufacturers ceased use of ozone-depleting substances.29  Second,
Mexichem Fluor asserted the EPA’s decision to remove HFCs from
the safe substitute list was arbitrary and capricious because the EPA
cited no explanation for the change.30  Based on new information,
the EPA argued it had the authority under Section 612 of the CAA
to change HFCs’ characterization as a safe substitute.31
Both parties agreed the EPA had the authority to remove HFCs
from the safe substitute list under the CAA, and the EPA could pre-
22. For further discussion of the legal background of the case, see infra notes
39-104 and accompanying text.
23. For further discussion of the court’s legal analysis of the issues presented
in Mexichem Fluor, see infra notes 105-142 and accompanying text.
24. For a critique of the court’s legal analysis and reasoning, see infra notes
143-194 and accompanying text.
25. For further discussion of the potential impact from Mexichem Fluor, see
infra notes 195-243 and accompanying text.
26. See Mexichem Fluor, Inc. v. EPA, 866 F.3d 451, 453, 456 (D.C. Cir. 2017)
(noting parties’ admission that HFCs are non-ozone-depleting substances and were
previously safe substitutes).
27. See id. at 453, 456 (explaining 2013 Presidential Order’s influence on 2015
rule and impact on companies).
28. See id. (stating Mexichem Fluor’s two arguments).
29. See id. at 456 (emphasizing HFCs’ status as non-ozone-depleting sub-
stance).  Procedurally, two cases with the same arguments were consolidated to
form Mexichem Fluor. See id.  (noting procedural history).
30. See id. (explaining Mexichem Fluor argued EPA failed to address all parts
of issue).
31. See Mexichem Fluor, 866 F.3d at 453 (discussing EPA’s argument based on
Section 612 of CAA).
4
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol30/iss2/4
2019] MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S UNEXPECTED IMPACT 325
vent companies that are still relying on ozone-depleting substances
from replacing these substances with HFCs.32  The issue was ulti-
mately narrow, asking only whether the EPA could mandate manu-
facturers who relied on HFCs’ safe alternative classification to stop
using HFCs as replacements for ozone-depleting substances.33
The D.C. Circuit, which has exclusive jurisdiction over this is-
sue, analyzed whether the EPA had statutory authority under Sec-
tion 612 of the CAA to prohibit HFCs’ use despite their previous
designation as safe alternatives to ozone-depleting substances.34
The Court additionally discussed whether EPA’s general removal of
HFCs from the safe substitute list was arbitrary and capricious.35  In
a split decision, Justice Kavanaugh wrote for the majority and held
the EPA lacked statutory authority to require manufacturers to re-
place HFCs with safer substances, even though the EPA’s reasoning
for the initial removal of HFCs from the safe substitute list was not
arbitrary and capricious.36  Although he vacated any portions of the
2015 rule requiring the replacement of HFCs, Justice Kavanaugh
remanded the case so the EPA could pursue this action on retroac-
tive disapproval grounds.37  Judge Wilkins dissented, arguing the
congressional intent of Section 612 was unclear, which indicated
deference should have been given to the EPA’s interpretation.38
III. THE ORIGINS OF WEBSTER’S ROLE
The CAA, worldwide agreements, and separation of powers
principles created the perfect storm that gave rise to Mexichem
Fluor’s facts.39  This section first examines the statute at issue, Sec-
tion 612 of the CAA, and its context on both a national and global
32. See id. at 457-58 (stating undisputed facts to help frame issue).
33. See id. at 458 (emphasizing issue is solely in regard to manufacturers that
already replaced all ozone-depleting substances).
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (2012) (providing D.C. Circuit with special juris-
diction over specific air issues); see also Mexichem Fluor, 866 F.3d at 458 (explaining
issues relating to separation of powers).
35. See Mexichem Fluor, 866 F.3d at 462 (holding EPA’s actions neither arbi-
trary nor capricious and vacating for lack of statutory authority).
36. Id. at 454, 464 (describing Justice Kavanaugh’s holding).
37. See id. at 462 (stating reasons for remand and necessary components to
succeeding under retroactive disapproval theory).
38. See id. at 464-65 (summarizing Judge Wilkins’ reason for dissenting).
39. For further discussion of the CAA, see infra notes 42-61 and accompany-
ing text. For further discussion of worldwide agreements, see infra notes 62-68 and
accompanying text.  For further discussion of separation of powers, see infra notes
69-92 and accompanying text.
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level.40  Next, this section will examine more specifically key statu-
tory interpretation and deference principles.41
A. Air (n.): “the mixture of invisible odorless tasteless gases . . .
that surrounds the earth.”42
The CAA addresses increasing amounts of air pollution due to
the expansion of United States’ populations in cities.43  Section
612, at issue in Mexichem Fluor and referred to as the Significant
New Alternatives Policy (SNAP), specifically alleviates the impact of
dangerous substances on the air by prohibiting the use of those sub-
stances.44  Although the word “ozone” does not appear in this sec-
tion of the CAA, Section 612 falls under a subchapter dedicated to
ozone protection and focuses on ozone-depleting substances.45
Section 612 sought to “replace” ozone-depleting substances with
safer alternatives for the environment.46
To achieve this goal, Section 612 calls for the use of federal
resources to research safe alternatives to ozone-depleting sub-
stances.47  All alternative substances must “reduce the overall risk to
human health and the environment; and [be] currently or poten-
tially available.”48  Finally, Section 612 allows for a right to add or
remove a substance from the safe substitute list, provided that the
petitioner demonstrates adequate reasons and support for this
action.49
The CAA’s legislative history reveals the senate bill encouraged
the substitution of a variety of substances that affect climate change,
40. For further discussion of the CAA and its context, see infra notes 42-61
and accompanying text.
41. For further discussion of statutory interpretation principles, see infra
notes 69-92 and accompanying text.
42. Air, WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d. ed. 1993) (providing
definition of “air”).
43. See 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2012) (discussing CAA’s purpose).
44. See 42 U.S.C. § 7671k (2012) (outlining SNAP policy and procedure); see
also id. § 7401 (conveying goal to enhance environmental protection).
45. See § 7671k (prohibiting class I and class II substances); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 7671a (2012) (defining class I and class II substances as ozone-depleting
substances).
46. See § 7671k (defining policy for removing class I and class II substances).
This policy intended to remove ozone-depleting substances “to the maximum ex-
tent practicable.” Id. (stating policy’s goal).
47. See § 7671k(b)(1) (discussing federal research programs dedicated to
finding safe alternatives).
48. § 7671k(c) (stating alternative substances’ requirements).
49. See 42 U.S.C. § 7671k(d) (2012) (explaining petition requirements).
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not just ozone-depleting substances.50  The conference committee
chose to adopt the house bill instead, which focused only on sub-
stances that depleted the ozone layer.51  Neither the senate nor the
house bill discussed the protocol for replacing a substitute that was
previously deemed “safe.”52
In 1994, the EPA formulated a regulation to address Section
612’s implementation.53  In discussing this regulation, the EPA
stated this section “‘does not authorize EPA to review substitutes for
substances that are not themselves’ ozone-depleting substances.”54
In contrast, the EPA stated “class I and class II substances are ‘re-
placed’ within the meaning of Section 612(c) each time a substitute
is used, so that once EPA identifies an unacceptable substitute, any
future use of such substitute is prohibited.”55  In 2009, the EPA de-
termined HFCs were dangerous greenhouse gases, even though
they were listed as safe substitutes to ozone-depleting substances.56
The EPA created a new rule in 2015 after determining green-
house gases were not safe substitutes to ozone-depleting sub-
stances.57  In this rule, the EPA stated it would no longer permit
HFCs as safe substitutes, and companies currently relying on HFCs
needed to cease using them by certain dates, depending on the
product and HFC type.58  The agency justified this new rule by find-
50. See S. 1630, 101st Cong., Tit. VII (as passed by Senate, Apr. 3, 1990) (em-
phasizing desire for global climate protection).
51. See S. 1630, 101st Cong., Tit. VII (as passed by the House, May 23, 1990)
(outlining ozone-depleting substances requirements later adopted in CAA Section
612); see also S. 1630, 101st Cong. (filed in House, Oct. 26, 1990) (Conf. Rep.)
(adopting house bill’s requirements for ozone-depleting substances).
52. See S. 1630, 101st Cong., Tit. VII (as passed by Senate, Apr. 3, 1990)
(neglecting to provide detail for replacing prior safe substitutes); see also S. 1630,
101st Cong., Tit. VII (as passed by the House, May 23, 1990) (omitting information
on replacement of previously accepted alternatives).
53. See Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 59 Fed. Reg. 13,044, 13,044 (Mar.
18, 1994) (discussing implementation of SNAP program).
54. Mexichem Fluor, Inc. v. EPA, 866 F.3d 451, 458 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (citing
EPA Response to Comments on 1994 Significant New Alternatives Policy Rule, J.A.
50) (recognizing EPA’s prior comments were consistent with only ozone-depleting
substances interpretation).
55. Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 59 Fed. Reg. at 13,048 (Mar. 18, 1994)
(responding to comments regarding substitutes for already approved substances).
56. For further discussion of the 2009 findings and the impact of greenhouse
gases on the environment, see supra note 12 and accompanying text.
57. See Protection of Stratospheric Ozone: Change of Listing Status for Cer-
tain Substitutes Under the Significant New Alternatives Policy Program [hereinaf-
ter 2015 Rule], 80 Fed. Reg. 42,870, 42,870 (July 20, 2015) (to be codified in 40
C.F.R. Part 82) (stating rule’s purpose in providing new substances). The new sub-
stances were to “pose lower risk overall to human health and the environment.”
Id. (explaining rule was to replace depleting substances with safer alternatives).
58. See id. at 42,923 (listing prohibited HFCs and end use dates).
7
Rossetti: Merriam-Webster's Unexpected Impact on the Environment: An Anlysi
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2019
328 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 30: p. 321
ing that HFCs damaged the environment and air more than easily
available alternatives.59  The EPA acknowledged this rule affected a
wide variety of industries.60  The agency also recognized the transi-
tion could be costly, but stated it could only consider substitute
costs, not transition costs, in accordance with the CAA.61
B. Agreement (n.): “harmony of opinion, action, or character”62
The Montreal Protocol, an agreement among the United Na-
tions to regulate ozone-depleting substances was influential in Sec-
tion 612’s formulation.63  Under this arrangement, countries
agreed to replace chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and other ozone-de-
pleting substances with safer substitutes.64  As a result of this agree-
ment, the amount of ozone-depleting substances has been reduced,
and “the ozone layer is expected to be fully healed near the middle
of the 21st century.”65
In 2016, countries’ delegates amended the Montreal Protocol
to include the Kigali Amendment after research revealed HFCs’
detrimental effects.66  The Amendment not only included phasing
out HFCs’ use, but also required wealthier countries to assist finan-
59. See id. at 42,871 (describing comparative approach and stating no safe
alternative determination was intended to be static).  “Most of the other alterna-
tives that EPA identified as having lower risk than those for which we proposed to
change the status have zero ODP or have negligible impact on stratospheric
ozone.” Id. at 42,923 (stating alternatives are safer than HFCs).
60. See id. at 42,873 (noting new rule’s effect on industries from plumbing
and air conditioning to motor vehicle manufacturing to food).
61. See id. at 42,897 (responding to comments concerning transition costs).
62. Agreement, WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d. ed. 1993)
(providing definition of “agreement”).
63. See Mexichem Fluor, Inc. v. EPA, 866 F.3d 451, 454 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (cit-
ing Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, opened for sig-
nature Sept. 16, 1987, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100–10, 1522 U.N.T.S. 29) (discussing
requirement to decrease use of substances depleting ozone layer); see also Ozone
Protection under Title VI of the Clean Air Act, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https:/
/www.epa.gov/ozone-layer-protection/ozone-protection-under-title-vi-clean-air-act
(last visited Dec. 14, 2018) (describing CAA’s subsection that addressed ozone de-
pletion’s purpose was to adhere to Montreal Protocol).
64. See International Treaties and Cooperation about the Protection of the Stratospheric
Ozone Layer, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/ozone-layer-
protection/international-treaties-and-cooperation (last visited Dec. 14, 2018)
(describing world commitment under Montreal Protocol to decrease ozone-deplet-
ing substance use to protect environment).
65. See id. (noting reduction requirements of ozone-depleting substances and
their impact on the environment).
66. See The Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol: Another Global Commitment
to Stop Climate Change, UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME (Dec. 8, 2016), https://
www.unenvironment.org/news-and-stories/news/kigali-amendment-montreal-pro-
tocol-another-global-commitment-stop-climate (describing HFC use and discover-
ing decreased use could reduce global warming by .5 degrees Celsius).
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cially poorer nations in this transition and prohibited countries
from trading HFCs to those that have not yet ratified the Amend-
ment.67  Per this Amendment, the United States must halt HFCs’
use and replace HFCs with safer substitutes by 2019.68
C. Separation (n.): “the act or process of separating”69
As part of our constitutional system’s foundation, courts do not
make the law, but instead, interpret it.70  Even if Congress, the
lawmakers, ineffectively addresses a pressing issue, courts still do
not have the authority to create the law.71  This principle extends to
government agencies, as Congress cannot delegate lawmaking
power to agencies without an intelligible principle.72  When Con-
gress’ delegation and statutory intent is unambiguous, little inter-
pretation is necessary.73  A problem arises when congressional
authority is unclear.74
To address this situation, Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc.75 provided a two-part framework for un-
derstanding the authority delegated by Congress.76  If
congressional intent is unambiguous, then the agency must follow
that intent, and the court has no further role.77  If congressional
intent is ambiguous, the court cannot provide its own interpreta-
67. See id. (discussing Kigali Amendment’s requirements).  Even companies
that create HFCs are part of this agreement, demonstrating their commitment
to protecting Earth. Id. (indicating chemical industries’ dedication to Kigali
Amendment).
68. See id. (noting different phase out dates for each country).  The United
States’ phase out date is one of the earliest because the United States is one of
richest countries. Id. (mandating most other countries to reduce by 2024).
69. Separation, WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d. ed. 1993)
(providing definition of “separation”).
70. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (outlining fundamental
separation of powers principles).  “It is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is.” Id. (describing court’s role in relation
to other branches of government).
71. See e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 636 (2006) (Breyer, J., concur-
ring) (noting need for congressional authorization to create military commis-
sions); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952) (noting
only Congress makes laws).
72. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-72 (1989) (explaining cir-
cumstances in which Congress can delegate power).
73. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984) (explaining unambiguous statutory intent is to be followed).
74. See id. (discussing how court must analyze issues further if congressional
intent is not clear).
75. 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (analyzing EPA’s interpretation of statute).
76. See id. at 843 (outlining two steps).
77. See id. (stating first step is always determining whether Congress specifi-
cally addressed issue).
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tion, but instead must give deference to the agency’s interpretation
so long as it is “based on a permissible construction of the stat-
ute.”78  Under this second part of the framework, an agency’s  inter-
pretation is not afforded deference only when it contradicts
congressional intent.79  Legislative history helps to define an ambig-
uous statute when the history is clear, but if the history is conflict-
ing, then it does little to resolve statutory ambiguities.80
In Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA81 and Center for Biological
Diversity v. EPA,82 the courts applied Chevron’s framework in the en-
vironmental context.83  In Utility Air Regulatory Group, the Supreme
Court determined the EPA did not have statutory authority to regu-
late greenhouse gases under part two of the Chevron framework and
noted the importance of interpreting a statute within its entire
framework.84  In Center for Biological Diversity, the D.C. Circuit found
the EPA met Chevron part two because the EPA’s interpretation was
reasonable, and it was not the court’s role to construct its own
interpretation.85
78. Id. at 843-44 (explaining courts should interpret congressional silence to
mean Congress left issue up to agency’s authority); see also City of Arlington v. FCC,
569 U.S. 290, 296 (2013) (discussing deference under Chevron).  Courts should
remember that “[c]ongress knows to speak in plain terms when it wishes to circum-
scribe, and in capacious terms when it wishes to enlarge, agency discretion.” City of
Arlington, 569 U.S. at 296 (emphasizing congressional silence’s significance).  To
determine whether an agency’s interpretation is “based on permissible construc-
tion of the statute,” the Court noted it should consider legislative and statutory
history in addition to whether the accommodation was reasonable. Chevron, 466
U.S. at 843-45 (listing court’s considerations).
79. See Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc., 478 U.S. 221, 233 (1986)
(noting only exception to general rule of deference to agency).
80. See Am. Bankers Ass’n v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 271 F.3d 262, 269
(D.C. Cir. 20011) (discussing legislative history’s role).
81. 573 U.S. 302 (2014) (analyzing case based on Chevron).
82. 749 F.3d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (discussing Chevron principles in environ-
mental case).
83. See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. at 324-25 (applying Chevron to
greenhouse gas emission case); see also Center for Biological Diversity v. EPA, 749 F.3d
at 1087 (determining EPA’s decision to wait for more research to promulgate joint
air rule met Chevron’s second step).
84. See Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 573 U.S. at 321 (explaining EPA’s interpreta-
tion failed Chevron step two due to its inconsistency with statute’s context). In this
case, the EPA used their authority under the CAA “‘to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions from new motor vehicles.’” Id. at 2436 (stating facts of case at issue).
The Court held this action was not within the statutory authority of the EPA be-
cause it increased “EPA’s regulatory authority without clear congressional authori-
zation” and overused government resources. Id. at 2444 (explaining reasoning for
holding based on Chevron).
85. See Center for Biological Diversity, 749 F.3d at 1089 (discussing CAA gave EPA
authority to reject promulgation based on uncertain research).
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Cases have recently questioned statutory interpretation princi-
ples and Chevron’s framework.86  In Michigan v. EPA,87 writing for
the majority, Justice Scalia favored a strict interpretation of statutes
under Chevron.88  Justice Thomas sought to completely abandon
deference to agencies, because he believed it deprived judges of
their decision making role and allowed agencies to overstep Con-
gress.89  On the opposite side, Justice Kagan proposed a more lib-
eral construction of Chevron, advocating for more deference and
policymaking authority to agencies.90  This view is supported by the
environment’s rapidly detrimental changes, which the Constitu-
tion’s framers likely did not anticipate.91  While a strict interpreta-
tion was the majority’s view, courts are reaching different
86. See Samuel B. Boxerman & Katharine Falahee Newman, D.C. Circuit Once
Again Reminds EPA Which Governmental Branch Enacts Laws, 38 No. 9 Westlaw J.
Envtl. 1, 3 (Nov. 2017) (describing courts’ conflict in all contexts over proper Chev-
ron interpretation); see also Elizabeth Slattery, Who Will Regulate the Regulators? Ad-
ministrative Agencies, the Separation of Powers, and Chevron Deference, THE HERITAGE
FOUNDATION (May 7, 2015), https://www.heritage.org/courts/report/who-will-reg
ulate-the-regulators-administrative-agencies-the-separation-powers-and (discussing
lack of clarity in Chevron’s application and Supreme Court’s need to create clearer
guidelines).
87. 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015) (considering environmental statutes’ interpre-
tation).
88. See id. at 2708 (cautioning against providing too much deference to EPA).
Justice Scalia stated Chevron “does not license interpretive gerrymanders under
which an agency keeps parts of statutory context it likes while throwing away parts
it does not.” Id. (highlighting limits to agency’s powers).
89. See id. at 2712-13 (favoring stricter interpretation of intent).  Justice
Thomas wrote, “Statutory ambiguity thus becomes an implicit delegation of rule-
making authority, and that authority is used not to find the best meaning of the
text, but to formulate legally binding rules to fill in gaps based on policy judg-
ments made by the agency rather than Congress.” Id. at 2713 (discussing dangers
of providing agencies with too much authority).
90. See id. at 2718 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (advocating for more deference to
agencies); see also Philip A. Wallach, Michigan v. EPA: Competing Conceptions of Defer-
ence Due to Administrative Agencies, BROOKINGS (June 29, 2015), https://www.brook
ings.edu/blog/planetpolicy/2015/06/29/michigan-v-epa-competing-conceptions-
of-deference-due-to-administrative-agencies-2/ (summarizing justices’ viewpoints
in Michigan v. EPA).  Justice Kagan believed deference is given because of the
“technical and complex arena” agencies navigate to create rules. See Michigan, 135
S. Ct. at 2718 (describing agency’s better understanding of issues it is tasked to
resolve). Considering these complexities, Justice Kagan argued courts lack the
ability to properly interpret the EPA’s role. See id. (illustrating court’s lack of in-
sight compared to that of agencies).
91. See Brad Plumer, How Brett Kavanaugh Could Reshape Environmental Law
From the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/07/10/climate/kavanaugh-environment-supreme-court.html (discussing
early laws’ lack of anticipation of current environmental issues).
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conclusions based on the same statutes due to Chevron’s unclear
application.92
D. Retroactive (adj.): “extending in scope or effect to a prior
time . . .”93
Under retroactive disapproval theory, a federal agency can
modify its own rule after consulting new information.94  There is a
presumption against this theory, unless one of two options are pre-
sent: an agency must either inherently possess authority to revise
prior determinations and do so in a timely manner, or it must pos-
sess statutory authority for this action.95  If Congress expressly pro-
vides a way to revise an error, then inherent authority does not
apply.96  The agency must also provide a reasonable and compel-
ling explanation for the need to revise.97  It does not have to
demonstrate that the change is better than the previous determina-
tion, but the agency still must show sufficient reasons for rectifica-
tion.98  Additionally, an agency cannot punish anyone who relied
on the prior determination and must give fair notice of the change
to these people or entities.99
92. See Slattery, supra note 86 (stating courts interpret same words differently
and reach different results under Chevron).
93. Retroactive, WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d. ed. 1993)
(providing definition of “retroactive”).
94. See, e.g., Vartelas v. Holder, 566 U.S. 257, 266 (2012) (applying retroactive
disapproval theory to immigration case and discussing presumption against the-
ory’s application); Ivy Sports Medicine, LLC v. Burwell, 767 F.3d 81, 86 (D.C. Cir.
2014) (applying retroactive disapproval theory).
95. See Ivy Sports Medicine, 767 F.3d at 86 (discussing agency’s inherent author-
ity).  This court stated the “‘power to reconsider is inherent in the power to de-
cide.’” Id. (stating agency’s reconsideration power).
96. See id. (explaining Congress’ express ability to rectify supersedes any in-
herent authority).
97. See Federal Communications Commission v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.,
556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009) (emphasizing need for good reasons for change).
98. See id. (stating agency must “believe” new version is better than prior
determination).
99. See Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 156 (2012)
(outlining principle that agencies cannot hold those who relied on prior rule lia-
ble after rule changed).
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E. Arbitrary (adj.): “existing or coming about seemingly at
random or by chance or as a capricious and
unreasonable act of will”100
The arbitrary and capricious standard is deferential to govern-
ment agencies and only requires a reasonable rule.101  The United
States Supreme Court recognized that “an agency must be given
ample latitude to ‘adapt their rules and policies to the demands of
changing circumstances.’”102  Courts should consider whether the
agency contemplated factors reflecting Congress’ intent and
whether it addressed all aspects of the issue.103  Additionally, courts
should determine if the agency provided evidence of a plausible
reason for its view.104
IV. PUTTING WEBSTER TO THE TEST: APPLYING WEBSTER’S
DEFINITION OF “REPLACE” TO EPA’S 2015 RULE
While Justice Kavanaugh and Judge Wilkins agreed that the
EPA’s decision to remove HFCs was not arbitrary and capricious,
they reached different conclusions based on their interpretation of
“replace.”105  Justice Kavanaugh took a strict approach to interpret-
ing Section 612, basing his conclusion largely on the framework of
the CAA.106  Judge Wilkins took a more liberal approach, finding
the definition of “replace” to be at least ambiguous, which war-
ranted agency deference.107
100. Arbitrary, WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d. ed. 1993)
(providing definition of “arbitrary”).
101. See Motor Vehicle Manuf. Assoc. of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm
Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. (State Farm), 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983) (stating standard allows
agencies to adapt their rules based on new circumstances); see also Communities
for a Better Env’t v. EPA, 748 F.3d 333, 335-36 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (explaining general
standard for arbitrary and capricious).
102. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 42 (noting agency’s ability to change rules with
good reason).
103. See id. at 43 (listing factors courts should consider when evaluating arbi-
trary and capricious standard).
104. See id. (stating plausible reasoning is arbitrary and capricious factor).
105. See Mexichem Fluor, Inc. v. EPA, 866 F.3d 451, 458, 465-66 (D.C. Cir.
2017) (addressing different interpretations of “replace”).
106. See id. at 459 (discussing statutory framework).
107. See id. at 465-74 (explaining Judge Wilkins’ reasoning).
13
Rossetti: Merriam-Webster's Unexpected Impact on the Environment: An Anlysi
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2019
334 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 30: p. 321
A. Majority (n.): “the quality or state of being greater”108
Justice Kavanaugh, writing on behalf of the majority, began
this opinion by examining whether the EPA had statutory authority
to create their 2015 rule under the CAA.109  After broadly recount-
ing the history of the CAA, Justice Kavanaugh narrowed the analysis
to Section 612 specifically.110  Justice Kavanaugh emphasized the
narrow nature of this issue and that the EPA previously indicated in
both 1994 and 1996 that it lacked the authority to require replace-
ment of non-ozone-depleting substances.111
1. Interpretation of The Clean Air Act
After emphasizing these points, Justice Kavanaugh analyzed
the CAA’s language, which boiled down to the definition of the
word “replace.”112  Section 612 prohibited replacement of ozone-
depleting substances with substances on the prohibited list.113  The
court faced two possible interpretations of “replace”: it could either
be an ongoing process where a manufacturer continued to replace
ozone-depleting substances every time it used a substitute, or re-
placement could be a one-time occurrence, completed once a man-
ufacturer initially employed a substitute.114  Through an analysis
largely based on dictionaries’ definitions of “replace,” Justice Kava-
naugh supported the latter interpretation.115
Citing various dictionaries, including Webster’s Dictionary,
American Heritage, and Oxford, Justice Kavanaugh determined
“replace” meant to “take the place of” and was a one-time occur-
rence.116  Appealing to every-day word usage, Justice Kavanaugh
108. Majority, WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d. ed. 1993)
(providing definition of “majority”).
109. See Mexichem Fluor, 866 F.3d at 456 (stating need to examine CAA first).
110. See id. at 454-55 (discussing CAA’s and Section 612’s history and pur-
pose).  For further discussion regarding the background of the CAA, see supra
notes 43-61 and accompanying text.
111. See Mexichem Fluor, 866 F.3d at 458 (describing EPA’s original comments
on Section 612 stating it only had authority to regulate ozone-depleting
substances).
112. See id. at 458-59 (discussing meanings and interpretations of “replace”).
113. See id. at 458 (restating Section 612’s key language).
114. See id. at 458-59 (stating EPA’s argument that replacement was “never
ending” and ongoing process).
115. See id. at 458-59 (concluding EPA’s interpretation was inconsistent with
congressional intent).  Justice Kavanaugh stated the EPA’s interpretation
“stretches the word replace beyond its ordinary meaning.” Id. (discussing imprac-
ticality of EPA’s interpretation).
116. See Mexichem Fluor, 866 F.3d at 458-59 (citing dictionaries’ definitions of
“replace”).
14
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol30/iss2/4
2019] MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S UNEXPECTED IMPACT 335
analogized replacement of ozone-depleting substances to replace-
ment of a president, explaining a new president only replaced the
former president once, not continually each day.117  Policy consid-
erations further supported this argument, because interpreting “re-
place” as continuous would implausibly give the EPA unlimited
authority to prohibit substances.118
Based on these findings, Justice Kavanaugh determined Sec-
tion 612’s language unambiguously demonstrated the EPA’s lack of
authority to continually regulate substances, which meant the EPA’s
challenge failed the first part of Chevron’s analysis.119  Legislative
history also supported this determination, because Congress
adopted the House’s narrower interpretation, which applied the
statute only to ozone-depleting substances.120  Justice Kavanaugh
briefly explained even if the statute did not fail under this part of
Chevron, it would inevitably fail under the second part as unreasona-
ble.121  Justice Kavanaugh conceded “[a]lthough we understand
and respect EPA’s overarching effort to fill that legislative void and
regulate HFCs, EPA may act only as authorized by Congress.”122  He
reasoned, based on precedent, that good intent did not overcome
an agency’s inability to make law.123
2. Alternatives
After demonstrating the EPA lacked statutory authority to cre-
ate the 2015 rule, Justice Kavanaugh noted other ways in which the
EPA could regulate HFCs.124  Justice Kavanaugh provided these op-
tions because “Congress has not yet enacted general climate change
legislation.”125  The EPA could still prevent manufacturers relying
on ozone-depleting substances from using HFCs as substitutes, reg-
117. See id. at 459 (analogizing situation to President Obama’s replacement of
President Bush to demonstrate replacement only occurs one time).
118. See id. (emphasizing 2015 rule gave EPA too much authority).  Justice
Kavanaugh stated, “[B]oundless interpretation of EPA’s authority under Section
612(c) borders on the absurd.” Id. (describing unlimited regulation power’s
implausibility).
119. See id. at 459 (summarizing majority’s conclusion based on interpretation
of “replace”).
120. See id. (explaining Congress chose House’s version of CAA, instead of
Senate’s version that broadly proposed regulation of all substances).
121. See Mexichem Fluor, 866 F.3d at 459 (discussing EPA’s unreasonable inter-
pretation of Section 612).
122. Id. at 460 (understanding EPA’s intentions, but nevertheless emphasiz-
ing it is not agency’s role to make law).
123. See id. at 469 (employing Util. Air Regulatory Grp. as example for this prin-
ciple and citing constitutional law precedent like Hamdan and Youngstown).
124. See id. at 460 (describing other ways to prevent HFC use).
125. Id. (emphasizing lack of congressional action in this area).
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ulate HFCs through the Toxic Substances Control Act, and require
any company currently relying on ozone-depleting substances to re-
place those substances.126  Additionally, Justice Kavanaugh stressed
the opportunity to pursue this case on remand under the retroac-
tive disapproval theory.127  He explained the EPA could succeed if
it demonstrated its authority to retroactively disapprove the basis
for the change,  and its compliance with due process.128
3. Arbitrary and Capricious
Despite Mexichem Fluor’s vehement objections, the D.C. Cir-
cuit held the EPA’s reasoning for removing HFCs from the safe sub-
stitute list was not arbitrary and capricious.129  According to Justice
Kavanaugh, the EPA provided ample evidence that HFCs detrimen-
tally affected the environment, were less safe than alternatives, and
had a detrimental “collective global impact.”130  In relation to the
costliness of replacing HFCs, Justice Kavanaugh stated it was reason-
able for the EPA not to pay transition costs, because the agency
provided additional time to comply with the new rule.131  Justice
Kavanaugh concluded that even though the EPA’s actions were not
arbitrary and capricious, they still were not justified given the lack
of statutory authority.132
B. Dissent (n.): “to withhold assent or approval”133
Judge Wilkins dissented primarily due to his disagreement
about the statute’s ambiguity.134  He adopted the EPA’s continuous
126. See Mexichem Fluor, 866 F.3d at 460 (addressing Section 612 is not only
way for EPA to regulate HFCs).
127. See id. (describing retroactive disapproval theory).
128. See id. at 461-62 (outlining steps EPA would need to meet to demonstrate
retroactive disapproval ability).  Justice Kavanaugh stated that meeting these steps
would not automatically guarantee success. See id. (stating only possibility of
success).
129. See id. 462-64 (refuting each argument Mexichem Fluor raised in relation
to arbitrary and capricious standard).
130. See id. (discussing dangers of HFCs and why their prohibition was reason-
able goal).
131. See Mexichem Fluor, 866 F.3d at 464 (rejecting Mexichem Fluor’s argu-
ment regarding transition costs because of “extra time to comply”).
132. See id. (summarizing holding).
133. Dissent, WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d. ed. 1993)
(providing definition of “dissent”).
134. See Mexichem Fluor, 866 F.3d at 464-65 (stating “replace” is open to many
different meanings which makes statute unclear).  Judge Wilkins emphasized
“[t]he bar for deciding a case at Chevron step one is high, requiring clear and
unambiguous congressional intent.” Id. at 464 (stating Chevron’s high bar under
part one to demonstrate that high bar was not met in Mexichem Fluor).
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replacement argument after examining the statutory scheme.135
Judge Wilkins determined “replace” meant to provide a “substitute
for,” which was more consistent with Section 612’s purpose and was
an alternative definition in the dictionaries the majority cited.136
Section 612 called for replacement of ozone-depleting substances
with “alternative manufacturing processes that reduce overall risks
to human health and the environment,” but the majority limited
EPA’s ability to do this by preventing EPA from forbidding HFCs.137
Judge Wilkins stated, “Congress undoubtedly knew how to instruct
EPA to develop a list of acceptable and unacceptable substitutes by
a certain date and then stop there,” and because Congress instead
was ambiguous, it implied that agencies were given discretion.138
Additionally, legislative history never addressed this precise issue.139
After finding Chevron part one was met, Judge Wilkins deferen-
tially analyzed the reasonableness of the EPA’s interpretation.140
Judge Wilkins concluded the EPA’s construction was reasonable for
the same reasons he believed the EPA’s interpretation passed Chev-
135. See id. at 465-66 (noting “replace” is not defined anywhere in statute).
Judge Wilkins also noted the majority opinion does not address retailers and Sec-
tion 612 is “written in the passive voice and without identifying a particular target
of the regulation . . . .” Id. at 466 (distinguishing retailers’ replacement from man-
ufacturers’ replacement).  Countering Justice Kavanaugh’s president analogy,
Judge Wilkins provided the analogy of replacing older medicines or other classes
of substances. See id. at 466 (providing examples of substances Section 612 applies
to that are not replaced just once).  In Judge Wilkins’ view, when new, more ad-
vanced classes of substances arrive, these substances continually replace each
other. See id. (explaining reasoning for continual replacement theory).
136. Id. at 467 (noting Section 612 uses “substitute” and “alternative” in its
text and title).
137. Id. at 467-68 (explaining majority’s ruling did not allow EPA to reduce
danger to humans and environment to “maximum extent practicable”).
138. Id. at 469 (citing City of Arlington, 569 U.S. 290 (2013)) (emphasizing
principle that congressional silence is intentional and meant to convey discretion
to agency).
139. See Mexichem Fluor, 866 F.3d at 469 (explaining legislative history did not
provide “sufficient clarity” that EPA’s interpretation was against Congress’ goals).
Judge Wilkins stated even though the EPA released an earlier statement indicating
they did not have the authority to create the 2015 rule, the EPA’s interpretation of
a statute is not necessarily the same as Congress’ interpretation. See id. at 469
(demonstrating EPA’s prior statements’ little importance in Section 612’s
interpretation).
140. See id. at 470 (noting “considerable weight” should be given to EPA’s
interpretation).
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ron part one.141  On this basis, Judge Wilkins opined that the 2015
rule should have been upheld.142
V. SHOULD WEBSTER HAVE BEEN INVOLVED?
Both Justice Kavanaugh and Judge Wilkins agreed the EPA’s
removal of HFCs from the safe substitute list was not arbitrary and
capricious, and prior case law supports their conclusion.143  Addi-
tionally, while Judge Wilkins did not address the retroactive disap-
proval theory, Justice Kavanaugh relied on precedent in
recommending this theory to the EPA.144  While the majority’s deci-
sion might hurt the environment, Justice Kavanaugh’s opinion up-
held fundamental constitutional principles and adhered to
precedent.145  Judge Wilkins’ dissenting opinion, though well-inten-
tioned, slightly overstepped the bounds of statutory interpreta-
tion.146  Due to a slow-moving Congress, this brings judges and
Americans to an unfortunate choice: tradition or environmental
protection.147
141. See id. at 471 (stating EPA’s definition of “replace” was reasonable).
Judge Wilkins noted the EPA’s authority to regulate is not indefinite, because once
ozone-depleting substances are no longer in use, the EPA’s authority is void. See id.
at 472 (noting entities were still using ozone-depleting substances).
142. See id. at 473 (summarizing dissenting opinion).
143. See State Farm, 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (supporting Judge Wilkins and Jus-
tice Kavanaugh’s decision because they considered relevant factors).  The EPA
considered all parts of the issue and relevant factors, offered a valid explanation
for the rule, and came to a plausible conclusion. See Mexichem Fluor, 866 F.3d at
462-64 (describing why removing HFCs from safe substitute list was not arbitrary
and capricious).
144. For further discussion of the retroactive disapproval theory, see supra
notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
145. For further discussion of fundamental constitutional principles, namely
separation of powers, see supra notes 69-92 and accompanying text.
146. For further discussion of why Justice Kavanaugh believed Judge Wilkins’
interpretation seemed to stretch the statute, see supra notes 112-118 and accompa-
nying text.
147. See Dana Nuccitelli, Kavanaugh’s Views on EPA’s Climate Authority are Dan-
gerous and Wrong, THE GUARDIAN (Sep. 10, 2018),  https://www.theguardian.com/
environment/climate-consensus-97-per-cent/2018/sep/10/kavanaughs-views-on-
epas-climate-authority-are-dangerous-and-wrong (explaining implications of strict
constitutionalist views).  While Justice Kavanaugh correctly stated that Congress
should create new laws, waiting for Congress to act leaves the environment without
protection from new threats. Id. (highlighting strict interpretation’s negative ef-
fect on environment).
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A. Framework (n.): “a basic conceptional structure (as of
ideas)”148
Both Justice Kavanaugh and Judge Wilkins provided valid in-
terpretations of the word “replace,” as supported by esteemed dic-
tionaries and common experience.149  “Replace” seems ambiguous
given its two acceptable meanings, but Justice Kavanaugh’s argu-
ment that the statute was proposed to regulate ozone-depleting sub-
stances is compelling.150 Utility Air Regulatory Group emphasized the
importance of interpreting statutory intent by looking at the entire
statutory framework.151  Justice Kavanaugh not only adhered to stat-
utory interpretation principles, but also to Supreme Court prece-
dent by emphasizing the purpose of the statute as a whole was to
replace ozone-depleting substances.152
Additionally, while Judge Wilkins’ argument that HFCs do not
“reduce[ ] the overall risk to human health and the environment”
is persuasive, nothing in the statute specifically suggests the EPA
holds authority to regulate safe substitutes once manufacturers
have ceased reliance on ozone-depleting substances.153  The pro-
cess of removing substances from the safe substitute list discussed in
the statute makes no mention of this authority.154  While congres-
sional silence can be interpreted to leave discretion to an agency,
clear legislative history and the context of this statute justifies Jus-
tice Kavanaugh’s interpretation.155
Despite ultimately reaching the accurate interpretation of clear
statutory intent, Justice Kavanaugh’s brief statement that the EPA’s
interpretation would still be unreasonable under Chevron part two
148. Framework, WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d. ed. 1993)
(providing definition of “framework”).
149. See Mexichem Fluor, Inc. v. EPA, 866 F.3d 451, 456, 466 (D.C. Cir. 2017)
(providing both Justice Kavanaugh’s and Judge Wilkins’ definitions of “replace”).
150. See 42 U.S.C. § 7671k (describing act’s purpose to prevent ozone-deplet-
ing substances’ usage).
151. See Util. Air. Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 321 (2014) (discuss-
ing key Chevron principles).
152. See id. (applying Chevron principles Justice Kavanaugh relied on).  For
further discussion of CAA’s purpose, see supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
153. See Mexichem Fluor, 866 F.3d at 454 (stating Judge Wilkins’ argument on
HFCs); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7671k (2012) (detailing language in CAA’s Section
612).
154. See § 7671k(d) (discussing petition process).
155. See City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 296 (2013) (noting if legisla-
tive history is unclear, then discretion is inferred). But see Am. Bankers Ass’n v.
Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 271 F.3d 262, 269 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (discussing impor-
tance of clear legislative history in interpretation); Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 573 U.S.
at 324-25 (discussing EPA’s lack of authority without strong authorization
evidence).
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appears to contradict key Chevron principles.156  Because intent was
clear, reasonableness was not at issue in this case.157  There was ulti-
mately no need to interpret part two of Chevron’s framework, which
means Justice Kavanaugh’s interpretation of reasonableness does
not change his valid conclusion.158
B. History (n.): “a chronological record of significant events . . .
often including an explanation of their causes”159
Although intent is clear from the statutory framework, the
CAA’s legislative history further supports Justice Kavanaugh’s argu-
ment.160  Judge Wilkins is correct that the legislative history does
not speak to the precise question at issue in Mexichem Fluor, but
Judge Wilkins under-emphasized the legislature’s focus on regulat-
ing only ozone-depleting substances.161  Narrowly focusing on Sec-
tion 612’s legislative history is favorable to Judge Wilkins because
the EPA’s statements cited by Justice Kavanaugh only slightly sup-
ports his view.162  While the EPA stated that it did have the author-
ity to regulate non-ozone-depleting substances, it also stated
“replace” was a continual process.163  Regardless of these conflict-
ing viewpoints, Judge Wilkins weakened this evidence by correctly
156. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984) (explaining reasonableness prong); see also Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Ce-
tacean Soc., 478 U.S. 221, 223 (1986) (discussing general rule of deference).
Courts give deference to an agency’s interpretation so long as the interpretation is
“permissible,” which is a low standard. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (demonstrating
low bar for second Chevron prong).  If intent was unclear here, then the EPA’s
interpretation was reasonable because HFCs’ regulation achieves the Act’s overall
goal of reducing dangerous substances in the environment, and the EPA is in a
better position than the court to determine reasonable steps to achieve this goal.
See 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2012) (noting statute’s purpose); see also Michigan v. EPA,
135 S. Ct. 2699, 2718 (2015) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (emphasizing agency is in bet-
ter position to interpret its role when intent is ambiguous).
157. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (indicating no need to interpret reasonable-
ness if Chevron part one is met).
158. For further discussion of the clear statutory intent in Mexichem Fluor, see
supra notes 112-123 and accompanying text.
159. History, WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d. ed. 1993)
(providing definition of “history”).
160. For further discussion of the CAA’s legislative history, see supra notes 50-
52 and accompanying text.
161. See Mexichem Fluor, Inc. v. EPA, 866 F.3d 451, 465 (D.C. Cir. 2017)
(describing Judge Wilkins’ view on legislative history); see also S. 1630, 101st Cong.
(filed in House, Oct. 26, 1990) (Conf. Rep.) (noting Congress’ intentional narrow-
ing of CAA to only address ozone-depleting substances).
162. For further discussion of EPA’s comments regarding Section 612, see
supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
163. For further discussion of the EPA’s statements, see supra notes 53-55 and
accompanying text.
20
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol30/iss2/4
2019] MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S UNEXPECTED IMPACT 341
pointing out that the EPA’s interpretation is not necessarily corre-
lated with Congress’ view.164  What matters is congressional intent,
which unambiguously granted the EPA the exclusive authority to
regulate ozone-depleting substances based on the CAA’s legislative
history.165
In a global context, the Montreal Protocol was influential in
Section 612’s creation.166  This Protocol only regulated ozone-de-
pleting substances.167  The Kigali Amendment, which sought to reg-
ulate HFCs, was formed in 2016, years after Section 612’s
adoption.168  This context further supports Justice Kavanaugh’s
view because when Section 612 was formed, the focus was only on
curtailing ozone-depleting substances’ use.169
C. Power (n.): “ability to act or produce an effect”170
Taking a textualist view, Justice Kavanaugh’s interpretation is
“correct” based on the separation of powers.171 If agencies receive
too much authority, they can essentially make laws without bicamer-
alism and presentment, which violates fundamental parts of Ameri-
can democracy.172  “When agencies strive to find ambiguity in
clarity, they bypass these [constitutional] safeguards and exceed the
bounds of their authority.”173  Justice Kavanaugh prevented this by
adhering to unambiguous congressional intent instead of stretch-
ing the statute’s reading to make it ambiguous.174  He also adhered
164. For further discussion of Judge Wilkins’ view of EPA’s comments, see
supra note 139 and accompanying text.
165. For further discussion of EPA’s authority to regulate ozone-depleting
substances, see supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
166. For further discussion of Montreal Protocol’s purpose, see supra notes
63-65 and accompanying text.
167. For further discussion of the Kigali Amendment, see supra notes 66-68
and accompanying text.
168. For further discussion of the Kigali Amendment’s context, see supra
notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
169. See 1990 Clean Air Act Amendment Summary: Title VI, EPA, https://
www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/1990-clean-air-act-amendment-summary-title-vi
(last visited Dec. 14, 2018) (describing 1990 CAA Amendment’s sole focus on
ozone-depleting substances).
170. Power, WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d. ed. 1993)
(providing definition of “power”).
171. For further discussion of separation of powers, see supra notes 69-74 and
accompanying text.
172. See Susannah Landes Foster, When Clarity Means Ambiguity: An Examina-
tion of Statutory Interpretation at the Environmental Protection Agency, 96 GEO. L.J. 1347,
1360 (Apr. 2008) (discussing problem with agency overstepping authority).
173. Id. at 1360 (reviewing statutory interpretation under Chevron).
174. See Mexichem Fluor, Inc. v. EPA, 866 F.3d 451, 460 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (im-
plementing separation of powers principles).
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to landmark separation of powers cases like Marbury v. Madison,175
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,176 and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,177
which emphasize the Court’s lack of lawmaking power.178
The Supreme Court case Michigan v. EPA presents strong argu-
ments both for and against applying strict statutory interpretations
to environmental agencies.179  Ultimately, the majority took a textu-
alist view, which means Justice Kavanaugh’s interpretation is consis-
tent with this Supreme Court precedent.180  Strict interpretation,
while slowing progress in the environmental context, ensures all
agencies do not abuse their power by taking on Congress’ role.181
While it is correct that the environment is changing, Justice
Kavanaugh indicated these changes reflect a need for a transforma-
tion in Congress, not in traditional constitutional principles.182
The current congressional makeup transformed the meaning of
“partisan” to an “us vs. them” mentality.183  A more active Congress
regularly updating environmental laws prevents the impossible
choice between tradition and environmental protection.184  Courts
175. 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (applying separation of powers principles to deter-
mine court’s role).
176. 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (deciding executive’s power in war context).
177. 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (discussing separation of powers principles).
178. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 636 (2006)(applying separation
of powers to military actions); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579, 587 (1952) (describing court’s incapability to make law); Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (emphasizing courts can only interpret law).
179. For further discussion of the arguments for and against applying strict
statutory interpretations to environmental agencies, see supra notes 87-92 and ac-
companying text.
180. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (holding EPA ex-
ceeded authority based on strict constitutionalist view).
181. See Foster, supra note 172 at 1367 (acknowledging benefits of stricter in-
terpretation of agency’s role). “[A]gencies should face some constraint in their
interpretation, short of judicial review, because agencies, like courts, are not as
democratically accountable and are not constrained by the same constitutional
safeguards when they make law as is Congress.” Id. (explaining lack of elections
for agencies indicates they might not adequately represent population’s views).
182. See Plumer, supra note 91 (discussing congressional inaction in environ-
mental context).
183. See Jay Cost, Why Congress Can’t Manage to Get Anything Done, N.Y. POST
(Apr. 22, 2018), https://nypost.com/2018/04/22/why-congress-cant-manage-to-
get-anything-done/ (attributing general lack of congressional action to “low parti-
sanship,” which loses sight of broader goals to win small battles). “Members of
Congress are too hung up on low partisanship – thwarting basic functions of gov-
ernment for the sake of scoring an edge in the next election.” Id. (discussing in-
ability to achieve common goals based on “us vs. them” mentality).
184. See Maya K. Van Rossum, Trump Won’t Protect the Environment – Congress
Must, THE HILL (June 9, 2017),  https://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/energy-
environment/337148-trump-wont-protect-the-environment-congress-must (discuss-
ing Congress’ ability to affect climate change in spite of Trump’s inaction); see also
Michael J. Coren, What It Will Take To Get Republicans and Democrats to Agree on
22
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cannot rescue the environment without the help of these laws.185
Demonstrating sympathy, Justice Kavanaugh accurately pointed out
ways in which the EPA could regulate HFCs and presented the EPA
with the opportunities to win this case on remand.186
D. Dictionary (n.): “A reference source in print or electronic
form containing words”187
Justice Kavanaugh’s dictionary use is supported by judicial
opinions since the origin of the court system.188  The definition of
the word “replace” used by the majority is “correct” based on Mer-
riam-Webster, but regardless of the “correct” interpretation, boiling
down a dangerous environmental hazard to one word in a statute
does not seem like the best way to resolve environmental issues.189
Like the subheadings of this Note, words hold deeper meanings
than their dictionary definitions, and resting major environmental
decisions on interpreting a single word could delay important envi-
ronmental initiatives.190
Because Congress has not formulated environmental laws since
the 1990’s, Justice Kavanaugh’s interpretation style cannot take the
sole blame for this issue.191  “[B]ecause [Justice Kavanaugh] consid-
ers global warming to be charged with a ‘huge policy imperative,’
he [is] skeptical that the Environment Protection Agency (or the
Global Warming, QUARTZ (May 27, 2018), https://qz.com/1290377/what-it-will-take
-to-get-republicans-are-democrats-to-agree-on-climate-change/ (depicting graphi-
cally earlier bipartisan notions to protect environment and Congress’ current par-
tisan emphasis, which negatively impacts environment).
185. For further discussion of separation of powers, see supra notes 69-92 and
accompanying text.
186. See Mexichem Fluor, Inc. v. EPA, 866 F.3d. 451, 461 (D.C. Cir. 2017)
(providing different congressionally approved methods to achieve similar results).
187. See Dictionary, WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d. ed. 1993)
(providing definition of “dictionary”).
188. See Liptak, supra note 2 (discussing dictionary use’s prevalence in court
opinions).
189. See Nuccitelli, supra note 147 (describing strict statutory interpretation’s
impact on environment because of congressional inaction).
190. See Liptak, supra note 2 (explaining dictionary definitions are not always
consistent with congressional intent).  “It [is] easy to stack the deck by finding a
definition that does or does not highlight a nuance that you’re interested in.” Id.
(indicating possibility of finding dictionary definition for any viewpoint).
191. See Plumer, supra note 91 (discussing lack of congressional environmen-
tal action since 1990s). Richard Lazarus, a Harvard Law School Professor, stated,
“Congress stopped making clean air laws after 1990, so the E.P.A. has to work with
increasingly tenuous statutory language.” Id. (illustrating need to stretch older
laws to fit changing environmental circumstances).
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executive branch) should be fighting it alone.”192  Justice Kava-
naugh properly put Congress on notice to choose their words care-
fully when drafting statutes and to create laws in the environmental
context.193  There would be no need to consult dictionaries and
rest major decisions on these interpretations if Congress laid out
new regulations addressing environmental problems that were not
contemplated in the 1990’s.194
VI. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S FAR-REACHING IMPACT
One Merriam-Webster definition could impact the environ-
ment and the law.195  The way in which the definition was employed
in Mexichem Fluor also helps to predict the future of the Supreme
Court with Justice Kavanaugh on the bench and the fate of Chev-
ron’s framework.196 Mexichem Fluor is more than one narrow deci-
sion, as it reflects a greater controversy over agency authority and
the future of the environment.197
A. Environment (n.): “the circumstances, objects, or conditions
by which one is surrounded”198
The D.C. Circuit’s holding could negatively impact the envi-
ronment due to HFCs’ harm to human health, role in increasing
192. Robinson Meyer, Brett Kavanaugh: ‘The Earth is Warming’, THE ATLANTIC
(July 11, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/07/what-
would-kavanaugh-mean-for-the-environment/564830/ (noting Justice Kavanaugh’s
hesitancy toward liberal interpretation of executive branch agency’s powers).
193. See id. (discussing importance of congressional action in environmental
law); see generally Amber Phillips, Congress’s Long History of Doing Nothing on Climate
Change, in 6 Acts, THE WASH. POST (Dec. 1, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/12/01/congresss-long-history-of-inaction-on-cli
mate-change-in-6-parts/?noredirect=con&utm_term=.955b47fa41e1 (outlining
Congress’ unsuccessful attempts to address climate change).
194. See Plumer, supra note 91 (emphasizing difficult task to apply older envi-
ronmental laws to newly arising environmental issues); see also Congress and Climate
Change, CTR. FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS, https://www.c2es.org/content/
congress-and-climate-change/ (last visited Dec. 14, 2018) (noting Congress’ reli-
ance on 1970 CAA to address climate change even though this issue was likely not
known to this Act’s framers).
195. See Mexichem Fluor, Inc. v. EPA, 866 F.3d 451, 458-59 (D.C. Cir. 2017)
(explaining importance of word “replace”).
196. For further discussion of Justice Kavanaugh’s impact on the Supreme
Court, see infra notes 214-223. For further discussion of the controversy surround-
ing Chevron’s framework, see supra notes 86-92.
197. For further discussion of Mexichem Fluor’s impact on agency authority,
see infra notes 232-243. For further discussion of this case’s impact on the environ-
ment, see infra notes 198-213.
198. See Environment, WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d. ed.
1993) (providing definition of “environment”).
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natural disasters, and contribution to global warming.199  The
United States placed twenty-seventh overall in environmental pro-
tection and showed  notable weakness in preventing greenhouse
gas emissions.200  As one of the first countries required to phase out
HFCs under the Kigali Amendment, the United States should be
leading in environmental protection in this area.201 Mexichem
Fluor’s continued allowance of HFCs’ use does not help to improve
the United States’ standing.202
In addition to the United States relatively poor environmental
progress, analysts predict a worldwide increase in HFC demand as
poorer countries develop.203  This expected increase is likely due to
a surge in demand for air conditioners and refrigerators in poorer
countries.204  The United States should cut back on using HFCs,
given this expected increase, but Mexichem Fluor thwarts this
effort.205
Some circumstances will ameliorate the potentially negative
impacts of Mexichem Fluor.206  Most importantly, the Kigali Amend-
ment specifically commits the United States to decreasing HFC
use.207  Although President Trump has not supported many envi-
ronmental efforts, the administration seems to support the Kigali
Amendment.208  Big companies also implore President Trump to
199. For further discussion of HFCs’ harmful effects, see supra notes 8-9 and
accompanying text.
200. See 2018 EPI Report, ENVTL. PERFORMANCE INDEX, https://epi.envirocen
ter.yale.edu/2018/report/category/hlt (last visited Dec. 14, 2018) (describing
study of 180 countries and highlighting United States’ comparatively weak
performance).
201. See The Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol: Another Global Commitment
to Stop Climate Change, supra note 66 (stating Kigali Amendment requires HFCs be
phased out by 2019).
202. See Mexichem Fluor, Inc. v. EPA, 866 F.3d 451, 464 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (al-
lowing continued use of HFCs).
203. See Stratospheric Protection Division, Benefits of Addressing HFCs under the
Montreal Protocol, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (July 2016), https://www.epa.
gov/sites/production/files/2016-07/documents/benefits_of_addressing_hfcs_un
der_the_montreal_protocol_2016.pdf (describing poorer countries need for prod-
ucts that generally contain HFCs).
204. See id. (discussing refrigeration’s reliance on HFCs).
205. See Mexichem Fluor, 866 F.3d at 464 (allowing continued HFC use in cer-
tain circumstances).
206. See The Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol: Another Global Commitment
to Stop Climate Change, supra note 66 (discussing Kigali Amendment to reduce HFC
use).
207. See id. (outlining Kigali Amendment’s goals).
208. See US Notifies UN of Paris Climate Deal Pullout, BBC NEWS (Aug. 5, 2017),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-40829987 (discussing Trump’s pull-
out of Paris Accord which in part attempts to limit greenhouse gas emissions). But
see American Bar Association, Chapter 26: Climate Change, Sustainable Development,
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remain a part of the Kigali Amendment, as the Amendment will
create thirty-three thousand job opportunities by 2027 if ratified.209
Additionally, many companies shifted from HFC use before
this ruling in anticipation of required HFC replacement.210  Fur-
ther, California is still implementing portions of the SNAP policy
into a new state program designed to combat HFCs, and one com-
mentator predicted the other eleven states that supported the
EPA’s rule will follow in California’s footsteps.211  Addressing Mex-
ichem Fluor and the importance of state environmental regulations,
Senator Lara of California stated, “This federal court decision on
super-polluting refrigerants is the latest sign that California cannot
look to the federal government for help in reaching our clean air
goals.”212 Mexichem Fluor thus inspired state courts to take action in
the environmental context.213
and Ecosystems, 2017 ABA ENV’T ENERGY, & RESOURCES L.: YEAR IN REV. 321, 323
(2017) (discussing Trump’s commitment to Kigali Amendment); see generally
Amanda Reilly, Trump Admin Mounts Defense of Obama’s HFC Crackdown, E&E
NEWS (Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060050272/print (noting
Trump administration’s support for Obama’s plans to decrease HFC use).
209. See Justin Worland, Big Business Wants to Stop Trump from Leaving This
Other Climate Deal, TIME (May 3, 2018), http://time.com/5264800/donald-trump-
kigali-amendment-hfcs/ (noting jobs will increase as part of Kigali Amendment).
210. See Ron Rajecki, HFC Ban Off Again as Court Denies Petition for Review, THE
NEWS (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.achrnews.com/articles/136469-hfc-ban-off-
again-as-court-denies-petition-for-review (discussing Mexichem Fluor’s holding in
light of recent attempts to reduce HFCs); see also US Court of Appeals Decision Regard-
ing the EPA SNAP Rule, HEATCRAFT (2017), http://www.heatcraftrpd.com/news/
2017/decision-regarding-epa-snap-rule-aug-2017/ (requiring manufacturers’ con-
tinued compliance with EPA’s 2015 rule despite Mexichem Fluor’s holding).
211. See Michael Garry, California Reacts to Court Ruling on HFCs, R744.COM
(Feb. 5, 2018),  http://www.r744.com/articles/8097/carb_reacts_to_court_ruling
_on_hfcs (discussing California’s disappointment in court’s decision in Mexichem
Fluor and work toward implementing state regulation to address HFCs); see also
Michael Garry, Honeywell to Appeal SNAP Case to Supreme Court, HYDROCARBONS21
(Feb. 7, 2018), http://hydrocarbons21.com/articles/8101/honeywell_to_ap-
peal_snap_case_to_supreme_court (noting eleven states supported EPA’s position
and could adopt state regulation to ameliorate Mexichem Fluor’s impact).
212. Michael Garry, California Reacts to Court Ruling on HFCs, R744.COM (Feb.
5, 2018),  http://www.r744.com/articles/8097/carb_reacts_to_court_ruling_on_
hfcs (quoting Senator Lara and other California officials expressing their disap-
pointment in Mexichem Fluor’s decision).
213. See id. (stating Mexichem Fluor served as impetus for states to act).
26
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol30/iss2/4
2019] MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S UNEXPECTED IMPACT 347
B. Supreme Court (n.): “the highest judicial tribunal in a
political unit”214
Justice Kavanaugh’s opinion not only affects the environment,
but also predicts the Supreme Court’s future.215  As demonstrated
in Mexichem Fluor, Justice Kavanaugh strictly interprets the Constitu-
tion and will likely overrule environmental regulations due to a lack
of explicit congressional authorization.216  Despite this viewpoint,
Justice Kavanaugh expressed empathy with the EPA in Mexichem
Fluor, and this empathy manifested itself in some of the Justice Kav-
anaugh’s prior decisions that favored the EPA.217  While some com-
mentators expressed concern regarding Justice Kavanaugh’s strict
interpretation, it does not seem that the he is “single-mindedly hos-
tile toward environmental lawmaking.”218  In a confirmation hear-
ing, Justice Kavanaugh stated, “I’m not a skeptic of regulation at all.
I’m a skeptic of unauthorized regulation, illegal regulation that is
outside the bounds of what the laws passed by the Congress have
said.”219  While it is likely that Justice Kavanaugh is a strong con-
servative against a more liberal interpretation of environmental stat-
utes, his approval does not paint an entirely glim picture of the
environment because the record reveals occasional votes in favor of
the EPA.220
What is perhaps most important is that Justice Kavanaugh was
nominated to replace Justice Kennedy, a notorious swing vote on
the Supreme Court.221  The addition of Justice Kavanaugh’s mainly
214. Supreme Court, WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d. ed. 1993)
(providing definition of “Supreme Court”).
215. See Conlon, supra note 19 (informing about Justice Kavanaugh’s confir-
mation to Supreme Court).
216. See Plumer, supra note 91 (discussing Justice Kavanaugh’s prior cases
demonstrating strict statutory interpretation).  In previous decisions, Justice Kava-
naugh emphasized the importance of congressional authorizations in environmen-
tal cases. See id. (explaining Justice Kavanaugh’s decisions generally stress
congressional action).  In one instance, the Supreme Court overturned Justice Kav-
anaugh’s decision by a six to two vote where some conservative justices favored a
liberal interpretation. See id. (recounting case that overturned Justice Kavanaugh’s
decision).
217. See id. (detailing Justice Kavanaugh’s prior decisions in favor of EPA).
218. Id. (quoting Harvard Law Professor Richard J. Lazarus).
219. See Ellen M. Gillmer, Kavanaugh Defends His Environmental Record, E&E
NEWS (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060095913 (demonstrat-
ing Justice Kavanaugh’s focus on separation of powers).
220. See id. (noting Justice Kavanaugh’s departure from Obama’s adoption of
older environmental laws to address new environmental issues).
221. See Meyer, supra note 192 (emphasizing importance of Justice Kennedy’s
swing vote).  “Kennedy voted in the majority in every environmental case in front of the
court except one . . . .” Id. (discussing Justice Kennedy’s rulings in environmental
cases).
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conservative views indicate Justice Kennedy’s role as swing vote will
likely be left unfulfilled, resulting in a consistent conservative ma-
jority.222  Justice Kavanaugh’s potential impact on the Supreme
Court in the environmental context comes down to Congress: if
Congress enacts more environmental laws, Justice Kavanaugh will
likely rule in favor of the EPA.223
C. Future (adj.): “that is to be”224
On January 26, 2018, the D.C. Circuit denied the EPA’s peti-
tion for rehearing, and Judge Wilkins again dissented.225  Three
manufacturers who intervened to defend the 2015 rule in Mexichem
Fluor then petitioned for certiorari to the Supreme Court.226  On
October 9, 2018, the Supreme Court denied certiorari.227  Due to
this denial and because the D.C. Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction
over this issue, it “can never be litigated again in any court of
appeals.”228
In light of Mexichem Fluor’s permanent decision, the EPA re-
scinded its entire 2015 rule.229  The EPA indicated that it agreed
with Mexichem Fluor’s holding and altered its policies to be more
222. See id. (noting Chief Justice John Roberts will likely hold the swing vote
instead of Justice Kavanaugh).
223. For further discussion of Justice Kavanaugh’s willingness to rule in favor
of the EPA when congressional intent is clear, see supra note 176 and accompany-
ing text.
224. Future, WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d. ed. 1993)
(providing definition of “future”).
225. See Mexichem Fluor, Inc. v. EPA, 866 F.3d 451, 464 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (re-
hearing en banc denied) (denying rehearing of Mexichem Fluor).
226. See generally Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Mexichem Fluor, 139 S.Ct. 322
(2018), petition for cert. filed, (No. 17-1703) (discussing reason for applying for certi-
orari).  Honeywell International and Chemours, who wrote separately from the
other petitioner, Natural Resources Defense Council, spent over one billion dol-
lars investing in alternatives to HFCs. See id. at 4. (describing reasoning for peti-
tion).  They claimed this investment was valueless because of Mexichem Fluor’s
holding. See id. (claiming proper reliance on statutory interpretation principles in
deciding to make this investment).
227. See Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Mexichem Fluor, Inc., 139 S.Ct. 322 (2018),
cert. denied, (No. 18-2) (discussing reasons for denying certiorari).
228. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 1-2, Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Mexichem
Fluor, Inc., 2018 WL 3210813, at *1 (2018) (describing D.C. Circuit’s special sole
jurisdiction over this issue).
229. See Protection of Stratospheric Ozone: Notification of Guidance and a
Stakeholder Meeting Concerning the Significant New Alternatives Policy (SNAP)
Program, 83 Fed. Reg. 18,433, 18,443-44 [hereinafter EPA’s Revocation of 2015
rule] (Apr. 27, 2018) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 82) (stating EPA’s new HFC
policy after Mexichem Fluor).
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consistent with this holding.230  The EPA stated it would not apply
HFCs to the 2015 Rule but would revisit this determination based
on stakeholders’ responses.231
Based on this complete revocation, eleven states are suing the
EPA.232  The spearhead of this suit, New York Attorney General Bar-
bara Underwood, “accused the EPA under President Donald
Trump of trying ‘to gut critical climate protection rules through the
backdoor’ by revoking the 2015 limits rather than going through a
public review process.”233  These states assert the EPA should have
provided public opportunity for comment before abandoning the
entire rule, especially since Mexichem Fluor only vacated the rule in
part.234  If these allegations are correct, it could undermine the
United States’ achievement of the Kigali Amendment’s goals.235
D. Law (n.): “a binding custom or practice of a community”236
Mexichem Fluor signals to future cases in the D.C. Circuit that
clear delegation of authority is necessary to survive a Chevron analy-
sis, a high and difficult burden for the EPA to meet.237  It will likely
be unacceptable to rely on older statutes to address new environ-
mental problems.238  Other circuits may approach this differently
and interpret older laws’ intent more liberally, but Mexichem Fluor
generated pressure on Congress to expand environmental protec-
230. See id. at 84,443 (expressing agreement with court’s decision and altering
rule to support Mexichem Fluor’s holding).
231. See id. at 18,443-44 (explaining and applying Mexichem Fluor’s ruling).
The EPA admitted there was no language in the 1994 rule that specifically and
narrowly permitted their 2015 rule, which is consistent with Mexichem Fluor. See id.
(applying Mexichem Fluor to new rule).
232. See Jonathan Stempel, U.S. States Sue EPA, Pruitt for Rolling Back Climate
Change Rule, REUTERS (June 27, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cli-
matechange-lawsuit/u-s-states-sue-epa-pruitt-for-rolling-back-climate-change-rule-id
USKBN1JN2UO (discussing eleven lawsuits over EPA’s revocation of 2015 rule).
233. See id. (explaining reasoning for states’ suits against EPA).
234. See Jon Fingas, 11 State Sue EPA Over Attempt to Reverse Ban on Ozone-harm-
ing HFCs, ENGADGET (June 27, 2018), https://www.engadget.com/2018/06/27/
states-sue-epa-over-hfc-rollback/ (stating Mexichem Fluor did not overrule 2015 rule
banning replacement of ozone-hostile substances with HFCs).
235. See Marianne Lavelle, 11 States Sue EPA’s Scott Pruitt Over Climate Super-
Pollutants, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (June 28, 2018), https://insideclimatenews.org/
news/27062018/hfcs-global-warming-climate-pollution-lawsuit-trump-epa-regula-
tions-kigali-amendment (discussing lawsuits’ implications on Kigali Amendment
and overall environmental protection).
236. Law, WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d. ed. 1993)
(providing definition of “law”).
237. See Mexichem Fluor, Inc. v. EPA, 866 F.3d 451, 460-61 (D.C. Cir. 2017)
(applying strict interpretation of CAA’s intent).
238. See Plumer, supra note 91 (stating no new environmental laws have been
passed since 1990s).
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tion laws.239  Additionally, this case demonstrates the impact of
Chevron’s ambiguity, as judges define words and interpret deference
differently.240  The Supreme Court needs to address Chevron’s appli-
cation more clearly to promote uniformity in its application.241
Congress also needs to be clearer in its delegation to agencies.242
In sum, Mexichem Fluor not only impacts future cases and the envi-
ronment, but also foreshadows an era of environmental conserva-
tism, given the Supreme Court’s new makeup with Justice
Kavanaugh on the bench.243
Christina Rossetti*
239. See Slattery, supra note 86 (discussing different results based on liberal or
strict interpretation style in Massachusetts v. EPA); see also Mexichem Fluor, 866 F.3d
at 460 (emphasizing Congress’ lack of environmental laws addressing climate
change).
240. See Slattery, supra note 86 (discussing several cases’ different results
under same statute because of Chevron confusion).  This problem extends beyond
just environmental cases. See id. (recounting other cases that Chevron’s confusion
impacted). Demonstrating this principle, Slattery provided the example that “two
appellate courts disagreed about the definition of an ‘applicant’ under the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act.” Id. (providing specific example of how one word can
affect case holdings because of Chevron’s confusion).
241. See id. (emphasizing need for Supreme Court to address Chevron more
clearly).  In noting the importance of the court’s role in regulating agencies, Slat-
tery posed the question, “If the courts will not, who will regulate the regulators?”
Id. (noting Court’s role of keeping agencies’ power in check).
242. See Nicholas R. Bednar & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Inevitability, 85
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1392, 1453-56 (Sept. 2017) (attributing Chevron’s confusion to
Congress’ poor delegation instead of to deference standard).
243. For further discussion of the impact in these areas, see supra notes 195-
243 and accompanying text.
* J.D. Candidate, 2020, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law;
B.S., Psychology, minor in Spanish, 2017, St. Joseph’s University.  I would like to
thank my family for their constant love and support.  I would also like to thank the
members of the Villanova Environmental Law Journal for their guidance throughout
the writing process.
30
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol30/iss2/4
